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Abstract 
Lamjung Yolmo is a Tibeto-Burman language of the Bodish branch spoken in Nepal. 
Like related languages it has a verbal system that includes evidential distinctions. In this 
paper I look at the role of these evidentials in interaction, and in relation to other features 
of grammar. These features include their relationship to events, interaction with subject 
person, endopathic verbs and negative polarity. I also look at constructions with no overt 
evidential marking, and evidential elision, to give a more rounded representation of the 
role of evidentiality for speakers of Lamjung Yolmo, and explore its role in audience 
perception of utterances.  
Keywords: Tibeto-Burman, Yolmo, evidentiality  
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1  Introduction 
Evidentiality is a well attested feature of Tibeto-Burman languages (LaPolla 2003b), particularly 
within the Bodish branch. In this paper I examine the evidential forms in the Lamjung variety of 
Yolmo
1
 (ISO 639-3 SCP), with particular focus on their relationship to other features of the grammar 
and the role they play in interaction. In taking this broader focus I hope to help drive forward the 
discussion on evidentiality in this linguistic area, and demonstrate that evidentiality cannot be 
analysed in isolation.  
Descriptions of the forms and functions of evidentiality are well represented for Tibeto-Burman 
languages (Caplow 2000; Garrett 2001; LaPolla 2003a; Grunow-Hårsta 2007; Hongladarom 2007; 
Hyslop 2011; Lidz 2007; Willis 2007), and I have given a basic description of the copulas in Lamjung 
Yolmo (Gawne, forthcoming). As Tournadre and LaPolla (2014) observe “Simply saying evidentials 
mark source of information does not capture all of the actual uses of evidential marking”. Instead, like 
them I take a much broader approach to what needs to be considered when discussing the use of 
evidentiality. In this paper I focus on a number of systems with which evidentiality interacts, 
including person-marking, endopathic verbs and negation to give a more nuanced picture of how 
speakers of Lamjung Yolmo use these forms in interaction. I also look at constructions without 
evidential marking, and elision of evidential forms, as well as listener perception of evidentiality, to 
give a more rounded picture of evidential use in the language.  
Yolmo is a Central Bodish language spoken in Nepal (Hari 2010). The majority of Yolmo 
speakers are from the Helambu and Melamchi Valleys area north of Kathmandu, but there are around 
700 speakers from half a dozen villages who reside in Lamjung, over 100kms from the original 
                                                          
1
  Yolmo is also known as Yohlmo, Hyolmo and Helambu Sherpa. 
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settlement. These Yolmo speakers have lived in Lamjung for around 100 years, and while their 
language is still highly mutually intelligible with the Yolmo of the Melamchi and Helambu Valleys 
there are some lexical and syntactic differences. Yolmo is also closely related to Kyirong (ISO 639-3 
KGY, Huber 2005) and Kagate (ISO 639-3 SYW, Gawne 2013b)  
Examples of Lamjung Yolmo are drawn from a corpus of elicited and naturalistic data, 
archived with Paradisec (catalog.paradisec.org.au/collections/LG1). Each example includes a 
reference with the speaker initials and the archival file number of the recording, which is also the date. 
One example in this paper comes from a written record, and is marked accordingly. Naturalistic 
examples also include a time code. 
2  Evidentiality in Lamjung Yolmo 
In this paper I will look the interactional use of evidentiality in Lamjung Yolmo, and a number of 
grammatical features with which it interacts to create complex patterns and distribution in usage. I 
begin by introducing the evidential forms, their semantics and basic functions in Section 2.1. I then 
explore how they interact with different event types (§2.2), grammatical subject (§2.3), endopathic 
verbs (§2.4) and negation (§2.5). These topics all explore how people choose the appropriate 
evidential form in interaction. In Section 2.6 I look at utterances with no marked evidential value, 
either through an evidentially unmarked grammatical structure, or elision of the evidential element in 
interaction. In Section 2.7 I examine the attention that interlocutors pay to the evidential forms people 
choose. 
2.1 Lamjung Yolmo evidential forms  
Lamjung Yolmo has a set of copula verbs. Not only do these verbs function as standard copulas, but 
like many Tibeto-Burman languages a subset are also used in auxiliary verb constructions (Anderson 
2006) where they contribute modal information, which includes evidential categories. Copulas are not 
inflected for person, number or politeness level and many do not distinguish tense. Instead they have 
functions that include equation and existence.  
Table 1 presents the copula forms in Lamjung Yolmo. The distinctions along the side denote 
functional distinctions, including arguments licensed and tense, while those along the top are the 
semantic distinctions. The negative form is presented beneath each affirmative form, and italicised. 
Table 1: The Lamjung Yolmo copula system 
 Egophoric Dubitative Perceptual 
evidence  
General fact 
Equation yìmba 
mìn 
yìnɖo 
mìnɖo 
(dùba) 
(mìnduba) 
 
- 
Existential 
present 
 
past 
yè 
mè 
 
yèʈo 
mèʈo 
  
dù 
mìndu 
dùba 
mìnduba 
 
òŋge 
mèoŋge 
 
yèke   yèba 
mèke   mèba 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, only the existential egophoric copula has distinct forms that occur in 
the past tense. The yèba form is related to the lexical -pa past tense suffix. The yèke form cannot be 
morphologically analysed as the -ke suffix is a non-past tense suffix for lexical verbs. 
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Semantically, there are four different categories of copula verbs in Lamjung Yolmo. The first is 
the egophoric, which is similar to the Standard Tibetan egophoric in that it is an evidential form that 
encodes information that is known personally by the speaker (ego Garrett 2001; Tournadre 2008). It is 
different to Standard Tibetan though, as the speaker does not have to be either the subject or closely 
affiliated with the subject
2
 to use the form, giving it wider scope. The dubitative is an epistemic 
marker that indicates reduced certainty on the part of the speaker, it is not an inferential evidential as 
there is no focus on or source needed to make a statement with a dubitative, although it can be used in 
similar situations. The perceptual evidential is for all kinds of sensory evidence. That it draws 
attention to the sensory means that it draws attention to the act of perception, which means that it can 
contextually acquire a pragmatic sense of ‘newness’ of information that others have confused for 
mirativity in related languages (DeLancey 1986; Hill 2012). The general fact copula is for those very 
generally known facts about the world, such as sugar being sweet. It is not frequently used in daily 
interaction. That the system includes copula forms that are epistemic (the dubitative) as well as 
evidential is one indicator that evidentiality is not a grammatical category that exists in isolation, but 
is part of the larger repertoire of modal options that speakers can draw on in interaction (see Gawne 
2013a for a more detailed discussion). 
Functionally, equational copulas are used in constructions that equate two noun phrases. The 
existential forms are used in existential constructions, but also in locational, possessive and attributive 
constructions as well, which is common for Tibeto-Burman existential copulas (Genetti 2007: 190; 
Hari 2010; Caplow 2000; Garrett 2001). There are distinct forms for each of these functions for the 
egophoric and the dubitative. The general fact copula only appears in existential-type constructions 
and has no corresponding equational form. The perceptual evidential is used on vary rare occasion by 
speakers as an equational, and this appears to be at the periphery of acceptable use,  
The copula does not only function as the main verb of a sentence; those in the bolded box 
within Table 1 can also function as an auxiliary in certain constructions. This is a common use of 
copulas in Tibeto-Burman languages and is also found in Melamchi Valley Yolmo (Hari 2010: 60) 
and Sherpa (Kelly 2004: 351). This subset of copula verbs can be used to add tense information as 
well as epistemic information about the evidential status of the utterance. The structures that include 
copulas as auxiliaries are perfective and imperfective, habitual and narrative past. In the examples 
presented below copulas that are used as auxiliaries are glossed AUX. I do not focus on the nature of 
the auxiliary constructions, but on the evidential contribution of the form to the utterance.  
Table 1 presents an initial challenge for discussing evidentiality in Lamjung Yolmo. The first 
limitation is that this paradigm does not include all of the evidential forms in Lamjung Yolmo. Like 
many other Tibeto-Burman languages, Yolmo also has a reported speech particle
3
 ló that operates 
external to this set. Therefore, the evidential forms do not exist in one clear syntactic category that can 
be examined in isolation. I do not discuss the reported speech evidential in any detail in this paper, but 
it presents its own interactionally complex patterns of use, and is discussed in detail in Gawne 
(2013a). The second challenge is that this is not exclusively a set of choices between evidential forms; 
the dubitative form is epistemic. The relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality has 
been a matter of on-going debate. Some consider evidentiality to be a completely separate 
                                                          
2
  As one reviewer noted, the notion of ‘subject’ is problematic in Tibetic languages, a better term may be 
something like ‘main speech act participant’ (Zeisler 2012, Tournadre 2014), however for this paper a broad 
idea of subject captures the main distinction between the egophoric in Tibetan and Lamjung Yolmo. 
3
  The Tibeto-Burman forms are discussed as ‘hearsay ‘or ‘inferential’, and may be clitics or suffixes instead of 
free particles. Matisoff (2003: 663) reconstructs *dz(y)ay as a ‘quotative particle’ in Proto-Tibeto-Burman, 
demonstrating a long areal presence. 
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phenomenon to modality (de Haan 1997, 2001a; Aikhenvald 2004); a second perspective is to 
subsume evidentiality within the category of epistemic modality (Bhat 1999); and a third is to 
consider evidentiality as a category within modality, on an equal footing to epistemic modality 
(Palmer 2001). In this paper I demonstrate that when we look at these forms in use in Lamjung 
Yolmo, it becomes difficult to argue that they are entirely functionally distinct categories.  
2.2 Evidentials and events 
The description of the copula verbs above demonstrates the broad differences in their functions. When 
we look more closely at how they are used in interaction, it becomes apparent that these basic features 
lead to the different forms being used for different events. As I demonstrate in this section, the 
differences lead to additional pragmatic features of these forms. In this regard I pay particular 
attention to the egophoric and the perceptual evidential, which are the two most frequently used 
copula categories. In this section I also demonstrate that while these forms are used in different 
contexts, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive in the contexts in which they can be used - 
instead speakers can choose to highlight their stance towards an event in the choice of copula they 
use. As Tournadre and LaPolla (2014) have also emphasised, evidentiality is not about objective 
evidence, but speakers’ subjective interactional stance, and what they wish to foreground.  
The first difference between the perceptual evidential and the egophoric is the specificity of the 
event being referred to. The deictic function of the perceptual evidential dù is to point to a specific 
instance of perception involving a specific event.  
 
(1)  dì  mì  thómbo dù  
 this person tall COP.PE.NEG 
 ‘this person is tall’ (AL 100924-01) 
 
(2)  dì  mì  thómbo yè  
 this person tall COP.EGO.NEG 
 ‘this person is tall’ (AL 100924-01) 
 
If a person uses the perceptual evidential when describing a tall person, they are referring to a 
specific incident of seeing a tall person. The event of someone being tall is not a specific event, as it is 
a property of that person, but the event of seeing this tall person is the specific event that the 
evidential is indicating. This has also been frequently observed in analyses of the cognate ʼdug in 
Standard Tibetan (Goldstein & Nornang 1970; Denwood 1999; Garrett 2001: 86, see also Caplow 
2000: 20 for Dokpa Tibetan). In all of these analyses a specific instance of perception contrasts with 
knowledge that has some duration. In Lamjung Yolmo the egophoric evidential points to the person’s 
own knowledge, and therefore the deictic reference is not to a specific event of perceiving a tall 
person, but the knowledge state of an individual about the tall person. 
The two examples below more clearly illustrate this contrast in the specificity of an event. 
Example (3) would be used if a person does not have children. Example (4) on the other hand would 
be used if a speaker did not have their children present at the time of the utterance. This is because the 
egophoric is for personally known information, while the perceptual points to a specific instance of an 
event, i.e. the non-presence of the children, but this does not also mean that beyond this event the 
speaker does not have children. 
 
(3)  pìʑa mè  
 child COP.EGO.NEG 
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 ‘I don’t have children’ (RL 110129-01) 
 
(4)  pìʑa mìndu  
 child COP.PE.NEG 
 ‘my children aren’t here’ (RL 110129-01) 
 
The egophoric is also preferred for habitual actions, which is further evidence that it is 
preferred for non-specific events, as opposed to the perceptual evidential, which is preferred for more 
specific, individual instances.  
The second difference between the perceptual and egophoric categories is the level of 
engagement with the context. By using the egophoric copula and deictically referring to their own 
knowledge, the speaker is showing that they have more personal knowledge of the context than if they 
had used the perceptual evidential, which involves pointing to something that they have perceived, 
indicating that someone else could also see what they are talking about. This means that for (2) the 
person speaking would have to be acquainted with the tall subject of the sentence so as to know they 
are tall. It should be noted that this is not on the level of close personal proximity as the egophoric in 
Tibetan, which would involve the speaker being closely related to the subject. Instead the relationship 
between the speaker and the subject is not as rigid, simply that the speaker knows the person, without 
necessarily any personal connection. This is a wider version of Garrett’s (2001: 41) concept of 
‘intimacy’ in of Standard Tibetan. The more personally acquainted with the knowledge a speaker is, 
the more appropriate the use of the egophoric becomes. Caplow (2000: 51) notes for Dokpa that it is 
possible to make copula choices to express a greater sense of involvement in an event. By using 
personal evidentials (equivalent to Lamjung Yolmo egophoric) to describe the states or activities of 
others, the speaker can indicate a personal connection in a way that using the perceptual evidential 
does not capture. 
The final distinction between the egophoric and perceptual copulas is that of a newly perceived 
event. This builds upon what we have already observed in relation to the specificity of an event and 
the speaker’s intimacy with the event, and stems from the fact that speakers prefer to only mark 
something as perceived if the act of perception was recent. 
To return to the descriptions of the tall person in (1), the perceptual evidential would be used if 
the tall person was a new acquaintance, or someone who has grown tall since you last saw them. This 
is because after a period of time it is not necessary to flag the specific instance of seeing the tall 
person (and their remarkable height); instead the egophoric would suffice. The perceptual evidential 
therefore predominantly marks recently perceived information, in contrast to the information that 
already exists as part of an individual’s personal knowledge. This has also been observed in the 
cognate form in Standard Tibetan (Tournadre 2008: 298; Vokurková 2008: 111) as well as Kyirong 
(Huber 2005). 
That there is a sense of newness should not be confused with mirativity. DeLancey (1997: 33) 
defines mirativity as information “new or surprising to the speaker, regardless of whether the 
information source is first- or second-hand.” In the examples above, the perceptual evidential in 
Lamjung Yolmo includes only events directly perceived by the speaker, so we can discount the 
‘second-hand’ information part of the definition. The difference between ‘new’ and ‘surprising’ 
information is worth considering, as they are quite different. While speakers may often use the 
perceptual evidential to show that something is newly perceived they are not necessarily surprised by 
these events, or lack “psychological preparation” (DeLancey 1997: 35) to deal with the events they 
are describing. Also, to describe these forms as ‘mirative’ is to take away from the fact that their 
primary function is to indicate perceptual evidence (see Hill 2012 for a more detail discussion with 
regard to Standard Tibetan). Others have separated out newness and surprise in their discussions of 
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perceptual evidentials in closely related languages, including Huber (2005) in her discussion of 
Kyirong and Zeisler (2000: 39-40), who takes into account a number of different Tibetic languages. 
Although the perceptual evidential forms in Lamjung Yolmo are not grammatical miratives, 
there are some specific instances where we see them used with a strong sense of surprise, or counter-
expectation. This is most frequently the role of the emphatic dùba form. Examples elicited for 
different contexts can show how they are used. The two examples below could be used as statements 
about the location of the speaker’s child. Sentence (5) would be used if a mother had left her child in 
someone else’s village and knew that the child was being looked after. Example (6) would be used if 
the mother expected that her child was at home, and found that instead the child was at another 
person’s house. The choice of the emphatic perceptual evidential over the regular perceptual 
evidential indicates that the information in (6) is not only new to the speaker, but also surprising. This 
would be further emphasised by an increase in pitch and volume, and other communicative indicators 
such as the accompanying gestures. 
 
(5)  ŋà=ki pìʑa khé=ki  yùl=la   yè 
 1SG=GEN child 2SG=GEN  village=LOC  COP.EGO 
 ‘my child is in your village’ (SKL 101023-06) 
 
(6)  ŋà=ki pìʑa  khé=ki  yùl=la   dùba 
 1SG=GEN  child  2SG=GEN  village=LOC  COP.PE.EMPH 
 ‘my child is in your village!’ (SKL 101023-06) 
 
This distinction can also be illustrated with more naturalistic examples. In this recording, I was 
performing a brief magic trick for AL. In this performed activity, I showed her the empty bag, and 
demonstrated for her that there was nothing inside. She observed this empty state (7) before I made a 
bank note ‘appear’ in the bag, and then she exclaimed (8). 
 
(7)  nàŋla  tɕí àŋ  mìndu   tòŋba-raŋ  dù 
 inside  none  COP.PE.NEG empty- EMPH COP.PE 
 ‘there is nothing inside, it is empty’ (AL 110217-03 01:50) 
 
(8)  (laughs)  ʈáŋa-raŋ  dùba 
  money-EMPH COP.PE.NEG 
 (laughs)  ‘there is money’ (AL 110217-03 02:02) 
 
Here the speaker expected an empty bag and had observed the state with the perceptual 
evidential, however the appearance of the money was contrary to her expectations (as indicated by the 
laughter, and exclamation immediately afterwards that her daughter should come and see the trick, as 
well as by the use of the emphatic dùba). 
These examples demonstrate the kind of psychological unpreparedness that DeLancey sees as 
key to mirativity. It is, however, only one use of the dùba form, which also has a non-past and an 
interrogative function, which may also relate to some of the features that make it effective as a marker 
of counter-expectation in interaction. There are also intonation cues such as increase in speech volume 
for others to tell that speaker is surprised. At best we can only say that in Lamjung Yolmo what 
DeLancey defines as mirativity is a pragmatic extension of the perceptual evidential, and not a core 
feature of its semantics. 
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The examples above show that different contexts call for either an egophoric copula or a 
perceptual evidential. Although they are the two most commonly used forms, neither can really be 
considered the ‘default’ different contexts call for different preferred forms.  
2.3 Evidentials and person 
The nature of evidentiality is such that the relationship between the speaker and the subject of an 
utterance influences the evidential form used. As we see in examples (9)-(11) the first person forms 
will often occur with egophoric, because this is the most appropriate evidential form to use for actions 
you perform, as you have personal knowledge of these actions. The perceptual evidential is more 
appropriate for second and third person subjects because you are a witness to their actions.
4
  
 
(9)  ŋà  tó   sà-teraŋ   yè 
 1SG  rice.cooked  eat-IPFV   AUX.PE 
 ‘I am eating rice’ (AL 100929-01) 
 
(10)  khé  tó   sà-ku  dù 
 2SG  rice.cooked  eat-IPFV  AUX.PE 
 ‘You are eating rice’ (AL 100929-01) 
 
(11)  khó  tó   sà-ku   dù 
 3SG  rice.cooked  eat-IPFV   AUX.PE 
 ‘He is eating rice’ (AL 100929-01) 
 
This type of patterning is similar to that of ‘conjunct/disjunct’ or ‘egophoricity’ systems (Hale 
1980, DeLancey 1992, Floyd et al. forthcoming), in that first person is distinct from second and third 
person through a self/other distinction this is accompanied by an interrogative structure where second 
person subjects in questions hold the same egophoric value as the first person declaratives. Lamjung 
Yolmo the mechanism is the egophoric evidential, and the question structure also occurs. I argue 
elsewhere (Gawne 2013a, in prep) that these analyses are limited, because they do not account for the 
full relationship between the evidential forms and different subjects, or the full relationship between 
evidential forms and other grammatical features. Although some elements of the discussion in this 
section will be familiar to readers acquainted with the conjunct/disjunct and egophoricity literature, I 
do not present them within such terms. 
Lamjung Yolmo speakers can also encode surprise at their own non-volitional actions with the 
perceptual evidential, as per (12), although this form would be marked to draw attention to the 
unexpectedness of their own dancing. Example (12) would be appropriate if the speaker had intended 
to not dance all evening and found themselves pulled into the action. 
 
(12)  ŋà  tàpse  tɕhám-ku  dù 
 1SG  now  dance-IPFV  AUX.PE 
 ‘I appear to be dancing’ (RL 110204-03) 
                                                          
4
  Two different imperfective forms are used in these constructions. Both indicate an event with internal 
duration, and it has not been possible to date to determine if any difference exist in their semantics. The -ku 
form can only occur with the perceptual evidential, while the -teraŋ form can occur with the egophoric, 
perceptual or dubitative, which accounts for their distribution to some extent. For more discussion of the 
past/non-past tense forms and perfective/imperfective aspectual forms see Gawne 2013a, forthcoming. 
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As Hargreaves (1991, 2005) showed for Kathmandu Newar, the semantics of the perceptual 
and egophoric evidentials in Lamjung Yolmo interact with the volitionality of the action. The 
egophoric cannot be used for first person non-volitional because the speaker’s knowledge of the event 
is not drawn from their existent knowledge state. Although volitionality is not a strong component of 
the semantic distinction of these verbs with first person, it is still one of the dimensions on which they 
operate. 
There are some contexts in which the same copula is used regardless of the person-marking of 
the subject. For example, when talking about a person’s name the egophoric is used if you are talking 
about your own name, the name of your interlocutor or another person (13)-(14). 
 
 (13)  ŋà=gi   mìn  rádʑ  yìmba 
 1SG=ERG  name  Raj  COP.EGO 
 ‘my name is Raj’ (RL 110204-03) 
 
 (14)  khó=gi   mìn  sòm yìmba 
 3SG.M=ERG  name  Som  COP.EGO 
 ‘his name is Som’ (RL 110129-01) 
 
When we consider that the perceptual evidential is only used when there is external evidence of 
something (or internal evidence for first person subject endopathic verbs, see Section 2.4) then it 
makes sense that speakers would use the egophoric for all speakers, as there is no external evidence of 
what a person’s name is. There are some fringe cases where the perceptual might be appropriate, such 
as reading a name tag of a person whose name you were not sure of, but speakers were reluctant to 
agree with such scenarios, perhaps because it was quite specific, unlikely and not a particularly polite 
interactive move. 
The perceptual evidential can be used for volitional first person actions, as long as another self 
undertakes those actions. Example (15) would be appropriate if the speaker was looking at a 
photograph or a video of themselves at a funeral, lighting one of the many butter candles that are 
burned during the ceremonial proceedings: 
 
(15)  ŋà=gi   bòti   pár-teraŋ  dù 
 1SG =ERG  candle(Nep)  light-IPFV  AUX.PE 
 ‘I am lighting a candle’ (RL 29/10/10 book 4, p. 18) 
 
In this example there is never any doubt that the speaker was acting volitionally in the image. 
The perceptual evidential is not being used because of a lack of volition, it is being used as its 
semantics indicate, for a witnessed event. This is only possible because the speaker is referring to an 
image of himself lighting a candle. It is not the action, but the perception of the action that is the focus 
here. Garrett (2001: 78, 166) also discusses scenarios where speakers use the perceptual evidential 
when talking about another version of oneself, such as in an image or video, as do Denwood (1999) 
and Tournadre (1998, 2003). 
2.4 Endopathic verbs 
Endopathic verbs offer an example of how the choice of copula form can interact with the semantics 
of other verbs in an utterance. Endopathic verbs are a subset of verbs relating to internal feelings, 
cognitive processes and sensations. Examples include kyáa ‘feel cold’, tóo ‘feel hungry’ and tèmba 
sàl ‘remember’. This class of verb differs from other verbs in that they are used with the perceptual 
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evidential for first person subject, but the perception is personal and internal, and unobservable by 
others. Tournadre and LaPolla (2014) discuss endopathic as a type of sensory access, but one that is 
internal and not accessible to others. Talking about other people as having the same states and 
emotions cannot be done using the perceptual evidential copula, as it is not possible to have 
perceptual evidence of the internal states of others. In these situations the egophoric form is used 
instead. These parameters mean that endopathic verbs have a different general split in egophoric and 
perceptual evidential for first versus second and third person subjects; with the perceptual evidential 
being used for first person subjects and the egophoric forms being used for second and third person 
subjects. Tournadre (1996: 206, see also Tournadre and Dorje 2003: 197-198) observes this patterning 
for Standard Tibetan and forged the ‘endopathic’ terminology. It has also been discussed by Garrett 
(2001: 19) for Standard Tibetan and Caplow (2000: 23) for Dokpa. It appears to be a relatively 
common feature of the Tibetic branch of Tibeto-Burman languages. 
There is one interesting example of the use of the egophoric copula with a second person 
endopathic verb in a declarative utterance in the Lamjung Yolmo corpus. In a telling of the story of 
the Jackal and Crow (Kelly & Gawne 2011) the crafty Jackal manages to get the crow to drop the fish 
he is holding by flattering him into singing. In his strategic flattery the Jackal declares that the Crow 
can sing (16). 
 
(16)  tɕàro khé lú nèn  ɕée  yè  
 crow 2SG song sing know  AUX.EGO 
 ‘crow, you know how to sing songs’ (RL 101027-01 01:46) 
 
Here the Jackal is presuming familiarity with the Crow’s (fictitious) ability to sing. In a second telling 
of the story, when the Crow shows reluctance to sing, the Jackal further goads him (17). 
 
(17)  lùndi  làp-sin  yìmba  ná  kí   
 jackal say-PST COP.EGO PART  or  
 khé=ki   lú  nèn  mè-ɕée  dùba 
 2SG=ERG  song  sing  NEG.NON.PST-know  AUX.PE.EMPH 
 ‘(the) jackal said ‘perhaps you [...] don’t know how to sing a song’5 (RL 101027-01 04:48) 
 
Here the Jackal has shifted to the perceptual evidential to indicate that the Crow has provided 
no evidence of his ability to sing, indicating that he does not know how. 
For first person, the use of the perceptual evidential for endopathic verbs does not occur if the 
utterance involves a habitual internal state or feeling (18). This is because of the focus on perception 
being related to a specific event as discussed in Section 2.2. 
 
(18)  còole ɲìma ʈàŋmaraŋ ŋà=la tóo yè 
 morning sun every  1SG=DAT hunger COP.EGO 
 ‘every morning I feel hungry’ (AL 091005-02) 
 
There are also examples where the use of different copulas with some endopathic verbs can 
actually give rise to difference sense. To demonstrate, (19) would be uttered if the person was ill in a 
                                                          
5
  Note that the use of the egophoric in the first line of this utterance is a part of the fixed grammatical 
construction yìmba ná kí that will not be discussed in this paper, but is examined in Gawne 2013a. 
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way that left no physical trace, such as a headache, while (20) would be for contexts where there were 
visible symptoms of the illness, such as vomiting, or sweating. 
 
(19)  mò nà-ti  yè 
 3SG.F  be.ill-PFV AUX.EGO 
 ‘she became ill’ (AL 120127-01) 
 
(20)  mò nà-ku  dù 
 3SG.F  be.ill-IPFV AUX.PE 
 ‘she appears ill’ (AL 120127-01) 
 
Therefore, it is not just the fact that a verb is in the endopathic category, but also the 
accompanying evidential information, that determines whether it is endopathic in context. If 
‘endopathic’ in Lamjung Yolmo is broader than a sub-set of verbs, this may indicates that what we 
see is a larger pattern in the conception of the cognitive delineation between ‘self’ and ‘other’ that is 
similar to Hargreaves’s (2011, 2012) analysis of internal state attribution in Kathmandu Newar. 
Hargreaves distinguishes between ‘self’ and ‘other’ in terms of knowledge structures, of which 
internal state attribution is one component. Such an analysis is concerned with looking at the way 
speakers construct knowledge attribution across the whole language. This treatment, rather than just a 
fixed list of ‘endopathic verbs’ in the grammar is a more holistic way of considering how people use 
these structures. 
Garrett (2001: 80) observes that the judgments Standard Tibetan speakers have about 
endopathic verbs and their modal properties are “quite robust”. When I overtly discussed the preferred 
copulas for different verbs with Lamjung Yolmo speakers I also got quite consistent descriptions from 
them, on which the above analysis is based. The endopathic verbs are not necessarily a clear-cut set 
that are easily distinguishable from other verbs, which we can observe from a broader range of the 
corpus data. While the existence of endopathic verbs does appear to be robust, there are fringes where 
speakers’ reported usage is different to actual production. 
Above I observed that endopathic verbs occur with perceptual evidential forms for first person 
subjects, however the use of egophoric evidentials for endopathic verbs with first person subjects 
appears to be at the fringes of general acceptable use. There are many examples such as those in (21) 
and (22) where first person constructions are given with the egophoric instead of the perceptual 
evidential. 
 
(21) ŋà=ki  née-teraŋ yè 
 1SG=ERG  think-IPFV AUX.EGO 
 ‘I am thinking’ (RL 110204-03) 
 
(22) ŋà=ki  sém  há kò yè 
 1SG=GEN mind know AUX.EGO 
 ‘I know’ 
 (lit. ‘my mind knows’) (AL 120122-02) 
 
It is possible that because speakers are producing these utterances in elicitation they are not 
referring to their own cognitive processes, but are using the egophoric to mark something more 
generic. Given how consistent the general attitude to endopathic verbs is amongst speakers, This is 
likely not the case. It is also possible in (22) that this is a more habitual or durative sense of knowing, 
or that the relationship between a person and their mind might be a complex internal state. It appears 
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that the boundary between what constitutes perceived knowledge that is internal to oneself and 
personal knowledge is a contextual gradation rather than grammatical absolutes. 
2.5 Evidentials and negation 
The relationship between the copula forms and negative polarity is worth considering, as the scope of 
the negation in relation to the propositional content and copula semantic is not always straight-
forward. This section provides a brief description of how negation and the semantics of the copula 
verbs interact. I have included this section because the relationship between negation and evidentiality 
is often overlooked in descriptions of these systems, the relationship to negation is also worth 
considering because it provides a different way of considering the relationship between evidentiality 
and modality, as I discuss below. All of the copulas in the paradigm have a single negative equivalent. 
This is different to lexical verbs, which have two different negative prefixes, with one being used for 
non-past and the other being used for past and imperative constructions. 
For the egophoric copulas, the evidence is internal and tied to the assertions people make, and 
is not part of the scope of the negation. Below are examples of negated egophoric copulas, including 
both a copula of identification mìn (23) and one of existence mè (24). The speaker is not negating 
their knowledge state, but only the propositional content of the utterance. 
 
 (23) mò  gòroŋ  mìn 
 3SG.F  Gurung  COP.EGO.NEG 
 ‘she is not Gurung’ (AL 110217-02) 
 
(24) ŋà  ɲímu  ʈáŋa  mè 
 1SG  with money  COP.EGO.NEG 
 ‘I have no money with me’ (RL 120217-02) 
 
In neither of these the participant can be said to be negating their own knowledge of the 
proposition they are putting forth, so we can say that the negation scopes does not include the 
evidential value of the utterance. 
The dubitative forms in (25) and (26) also include both an identification form (mìnɖo) and an 
existential form (mèʈo). 
 
(25) kauli   mìnɖo 
 cauliflower(Nep) COP.DUB.NEG 
 ‘it is probably not a cauliflower’ (SL 120214-02 10:44) 
 
(26) mì  òŋ  mèʈo 
 person  come  COP.DUB.NEG 
 ‘the person is probably not coming’ (RL 101028-04) 
 
In this situation the negation has scope over the content of the clause, but not the possibility, so 
the evidential is not within the scope of the negation. 
The perceptual evidential copulas have the clearest relationship between the evidential value 
and negation of all of the forms under consideration. Both of the utterances in (27) and (28) involve a 
person looking at the thing that is being referenced. 
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(27) òodi khí tɕómbo mìndu 
 that dog big COP.PE.NEG 
 ‘that dog is not big’ (AL 100924-01) 
 
(28) nàŋla tɕí àŋ mìndu 
 inside nothing COP.PE.NEG 
 ‘there is nothing inside’ (AL 110217-03 01:50) 
 
With the perceptual evidential in Lamjung Yolmo, it is not the act of perceiving that is negated, 
but the information that is being described with the perceptual evidential. Therefore, the negation does 
not incorporate the perceptual evidential. 
The general fact copula has restricted used in Lamjung Yolmo, but speakers consistently use it 
in the appropriate context in elicitation. The negative form is presented in (29). 
 
(29) kálaŋ sè ŋàrmu mèòŋge 
 lapsi  sweet COP.GF.NEG 
 ‘lapsi (fruit) are not sweet’ (RL 101125-01) 
 
The scope of the negation with the general fact copula is quite difficult to discern compared to 
some of the other examples. It is possible that it can be interpreted that the negation scopes over the 
evidential, and so it could be that lapsi are sweet, but this is not a generally known fact. However, in 
this specific instance (given that lapsi are very sour), and what appears to be the case for all uses of 
the general fact, the negation scopes under the evidential and is instead negating the property of the 
item referred to, and not its status as a general fact. 
I cannot include the reported speech particle in this discussion, as there is no negated reported 
speech form, not is it possible to negate the particle. The reported speech particle is only used when 
there is a specific reported speech event that can be marked, the absence of a speech even (or the 
presence of another speech event) do not meet the conditions for its use.  
Willett (1988) and de Haan (1997) have argued that evidentials are distinct from the category of 
modals because negation does not scope over evidentials. Although the perceptual evidential in 
Lamjung Yolmo scopes over negation, this is not a definitive reason to exclude it from a discussion of 
modality, especially given that the dubitative, which is clearly modal, also appears to scope over 
negation. 
2.6 The absence of evidentiality 
When looking at the interactional weight of evidential forms, it is also worth remembering that in 
Lamjung Yolmo they do not occur in all utterances. As mentioned in Section 2.1, there are 
constructions like the basic past (30) and non-past (31): 
 
(30) tòŋla  dènmu  lè  zò-sin 
 before like.this  work  make-PST 
 ‘before (he) worked like this’ (AL 091108-01 39:20) 
 
(31) ŋà  tàpse tó   sà-ke 
  1SG  now  rice.cooked  eat-NON.PST 
  ‘I am now eating rice’ (AL 100930-01) 
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This utterance could be used regardless of whether the person has been seen or not. As it can be 
used for a specific instance of something it is not possible to just assume that there is a default modal 
value assigned to these copula-less constructions. Garrett (2001: 113-114) observes that in Standard 
Tibetan those verbs that are unmarked with a copula are underlyingly egophoric; however in Lamjung 
Yolmo, given that the egophoric has a wider range of use, it is not possible to say whether a speaker 
would be drawing on perceptual or personal knowledge in many cases where there is no overt 
marking. In (30) the speaker is looking at an image of a man working, using her perception and 
referencing a specific event. It would appear that overt evidentiality is not relevant to these clauses, 
and epistemic certainty is assumed because it has not been marked otherwise as uncertain. 
The use of copula-less tensed constructions is quite frequent in some genres of discourse. This 
includes explications and first person narratives. I will begin by looking at these, and then move on to 
examples where speakers alternate between constructions with less predictability. In these instances I 
will explore what motivates the lack of copula use, and what that says about construction of 
knowledge in interaction. 
The genre with the most obvious absence of evidential forms is explication. There is no use of 
perceptual evidentials across the explication recordings in the corpus, and very few examples of the 
egophoric copula. Explication involves talking about an abstract set of actions, rather than a specific 
individual event, which would explain why the perceptual evidential is not used. In this genre the 
speaker uses egophoric forms very infrequently too. This may be because again they are not speaking 
of a specific event, and therefore their person knowledge of the actions does not need to be 
foregrounded, or perhaps because they are giving instructions on actions they do not need to 
foreground their personal knowledge, with a default egophoric reading similar to Garrett’s analysis 
discussed above. 
First person narratives also exhibit low use of copula forms. The use of the picture narrative 
Family Story activity (San Roque et al. 2012) provides an interesting example of this, as we can 
compare the first person telling to the third person and general descriptive tellings of the story of a 
family drama in a small village. The third person description of events include use of the perceptual 
evidential, as well as some egophoric forms, while the first person descriptions use few egophoric 
constructions and many copula-less constructions. For example, in the fifth card of the story, the man 
and his wife are sitting in court after he has hit her. The actual hitting event is presented in a 
subsequent card (as the images are initially given to participants out of any clear narrative order), but 
the man is restrained and the woman is heavily bandaged. The utterances in (23) are from the first 
time SBL is describing the cards. 
 
(32) pèemi  gòo  róp-sin  dù   khyóga=ki kyàp dùba  
 wife  head  break-PST  AUX.PE  husband=ERG hit AUX.PE.EMPH  
 khyóga=ki  kyàp  yèʈo  
 husband=EGO  hit  AUX.DUB 
 ‘the wife’s head was broken, the husband hit her, the husband probably hit her’  
 (SBL 101124-04 01:10) 
 
Here SBL uses a narrative past to describe the wife’s state, before claiming that the husband hit 
her. Although this statement is based on assertion SBL uses the emphatic perceptual evidential. He 
realises that he does not actually have any perceptual evidence of the event itself, only the residual 
evidence of the wound and so downgrades the epistemic assertion of his statement in the next 
utterance. This example is interesting it itself in that it shows people monitor their own evidential use 
to ensure that it matches their own knowledge state. It is also useful to compare it to a later iteration of 
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the same events. When he is reporting these events from the perspective of the husband in the final 
telling there is no evidence marking used (33). 
 
(33) òolegi   kyàp  tér-sin 
 and.then   hit  give-PST 
 ‘and then I hit her’ (SBL 101124-04 28:23) 
 
Although actions and events reported by first person can use the egophoric copula it appears 
that in extended narratives speakers find modally-unmarked tense sufficient. This is not surprising, as 
the modal value of events relayed by a participant (although in this case a hypothetical participant) 
can be inferred to be egophoric knowledge. There are some utterances like (34) that do overtly mark 
egophoric in narratives that otherwise have large stretches without the use of any copulas. 
 
(34) ŋà=la   láure   kwèla  tér-ti   yè 
 1SG=DAT  soldier(Nep)  clothing  give-PFV   AUX.COP 
 ‘the soldiers gave me clothing’ (SBL 101124-03 25:42) 
 
However, even when telling your own story, things still happen to other people. In such situations though, 
the first person narrator uses a modally unmarked past tense (35)-(36) construction. 
 
(35) ònɖa rò  dzàti  dzàmma  bònti-sin 
 that.way  friend  group  all   say(Nep)-PST 
 ‘in that way, all my friends spoke’ (SBL 101124-03 27:02) 
 
(36) ɖàmba=la  kyàp-timaraŋ  pèemi  ŋù-sin 
 cheek=DAT  hit-after    wife  cry-PST 
 ‘After (I) hit (her) on her cheek, my wife cried’ (SBL 101124-03 30:38) 
 
This indicates that the speaker does not feel the need to mark that they witnessed the event if 
the narrative framework appears to make it clear to others they were a participant in the events. This 
then raises the question of why speakers will chose to use these copula-less modally-unmarked forms 
in interaction when they also have the option of marking the information modally. There are some 
general observations that can be made from the Lamjung Yolmo corpus about how speakers alternate 
between modally marked and unmarked forms, but it is important to note that there is no way to 
predict whether a speaker will chose to use a construction that includes a copulas in auxiliary 
function, such as the -ku dù imperfective construction, or when they will use an unmarked past form 
lie -sin. Both constructions are used with the same verbs, often in the same context, so we can rule out 
the possibility that there may be something inherent about the action or the internal logistics of an 
event that dictate which form is appropriate. It is possible then that speakers are making a primary 
choice as to whether they want to mark the internal aspect of the event, as in choosing the 
imperfective construction, mark their evidential status as a secondary feature of the construction.  
That some constructions do not have any evidential value is not a flaw or an absence in the system, but a 
basic feature of it. As I have shown in this section, speakers prefer these constructions for specific discourse 
types and can use different constructions to mark something using the set of copulas should the communicative 
need arise. Just because the speakers are not using overt copula forms does not mean that they are not 
cognitively tracking this information.  
So far I have focused on those constructions where the use of copulas is not licensed as part of 
a grammatical utterance. There are also situations where there is no overt copula marking due to 
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omission as a natural feature of interactional discourse. There are some types of interaction where 
speakers frequently omit copula verbs from constructions where they are included with high 
frequency in elicitation. We see this in particularly in genres where one participant talks more than the 
other, including narrative and explication. In (37) ST uses a perfective marker -ti, which is followed 
by either an egophoric or a perceptual evidential in elicitation. In (38) the same speaker uses a 
nominalising suffix -kandi, which usually followed by an egophoric in elicited version of the same 
construction.  
 
(37) tɕhú=la   lú-ti 
 water=LOC  put.into-PFV 
 ‘put into the water’ (ST 120307-01 00:02) 
 
(38) tshé   yìndzo-ni  pába  kyúr-kandi 
 cooked.be  from-FOC  skin  throw-NMLZ 
 ‘remove the shell (from the egg)’ (ST 120307-01 00:18) 
 
The lack of overt copulas in these individual examples is explained by the fact that these 
utterances exist in a larger context. Any evidential that would be present could be inferred from 
context. For example, with the explicative texts the speakers were not referring to a specific instance 
of an event, but a general description of a frequently performed task. The lack of evidence marking 
does not detract from the speaker’s role as the author of an utterance. As Aikhenvald (2004: 79) 
observes, the ability to do this relies on the sentence being in ‘connected speech’ where the 
interactional context makes clear what evidence the speaker intended. Aikhenvald presents a narrative 
as an example of connected speech, but there is no reason to assume that other interactions cannot 
support the absence of copula verbs. De Haan (2001b: 197) acknowledges that evidentials are optional 
in most languages. He summarises that the motivation for this optionality “can best be seen as either 
the absence of evidence or a choice on the part of the speaker not to express his/her evidence for the 
action described.” In most examples from Lamjung Yolmo the first motivation does not appear to be 
particularly robust, as speakers omitted copula forms when they had direct visual evidence. The 
second motivation appears to be closer to the reason that Lamjung Yolmo speakers omit copulas, 
although they appear to do this simply because the evidence should easily be inferred from context, 
and not to avoid making a modal claim. Aikhenvald (2004: 78-79) discusses this process as one of 
‘omission’ rather than optionality, which reflects a focus on languages with obligatory marking of 
evidential information on every sentence, such as Tucano and Tariana (see also Aikhenvald 2003). In 
a language like Lamjung Yolmo, where the system is flexible enough to allow for a great deal of 
variation, talk of ‘omission’ implies that there is a rigidity to the system and that it is context that 
distorts this, whereas to talk of ‘optionality’ is to accept that a system like that found in Lamjung 
Yolmo is naturally variable depending on the interactional needs of the speakers, this is a key feature 
of Tournadre and LaPolla’s (2014) definition of evidentiality, where they refer to it as the speaker’s 
‘strategy’. 
This requires us to consider just how important the Lamjung Yolmo copula verbs, and the 
modal distinctions they provide, really are for the interactions in which they are used. As I have 
shown, there are often-used constructions with no modal status, and even in situations where a copula 
could be used speakers often omit them if they assume that their modal status is recoverable from 
context. Thus it appears that the copula verbs of Lamjung Yolmo, while useful (and in some contexts 
still necessary), do not carry the same kind of obligatory use as is described for some of the languages 
of Amazonia (Aikhenvald 2004), nor even closely related languages like Standard Tibetan (Garrett 
2001). 
Lauren GAWNE | Evidentiality in Lamjung Yolmo | JSEALS X (2014) 
91 
2.7 Do people attend to evidential information? 
In this paper so far, I have argued that the evidential and epistemic choices available in Lamjung 
Yolmo are important grammatical features for indicating knowledge and stance in interaction. As 
speakers draw on a range of information to make these choices, it follows that their interlocutors 
would attend to this information. Much of the discussion about evidentiality focuses on the evidential 
choices people make, it is also important to consider how these choices are taken up by the 
interlocutors who hear them. This can be difficult to trace in discourse, and so I created an 
experimental activity that I named the “Multiple Reports task” to try and access some of these 
intuitions. The task was designed so that there was a short scenario given, such as a new goat in the 
village, or a question about what was being cooked for dinner. There were then two different remarks 
from two people on an element of this event. The two reports were given with one different detail, and 
had different evidential values, for example one person might have said the new goat was brown and 
used an egophoric evidential, the other black with a perceptual evidential. The participants were then 
asked which of the two reports they thought was most likely to be true (the information encoded by 
each copula was switched for each participant, so as to see if the content of the utterance was affecting 
their choice). The intention of this experiment was to see how much attention speakers paid to modal 
information encoded in copulas by seeing which. There were ten different scenarios, with reports of 
different modal weigh. This task was run with five people. This was not enough speakers to be able to 
perform a quantifiable analysis of the answers given, but the task did give some insight into how 
speakers might process evidential information. 
Of the ten scenarios there were only two where the clear majority of participants chose the 
report with the same copula form. In the first of these two scenarios, a participant is told that their 
friend has a new dress, which they have not seen. They are given two reports about the dress, each 
saying it is a different colour (red or green). One report uses the egophoric copula yè to describe the 
colour of the dress and the other uses the emphatic perceptual evidential dùba in their description. 
Regardless of which colour it marked, all participants chose the answer with the perceptual emphatic 
over the egophoric copula. Those participants who gave a reason said it was because the person who 
used the perceptual evidential had seen the dress. In many ways this was one of the better designed of 
the Multiple Reports scenarios as there is minimal chance of external context distracting from the 
binary choice. It also indicated that people place value on their interlocutors providing perceptual 
evidence. In the second of the two consistently answered scenarios, participants were asked which 
report they believed about what food was stored in a vessel. The two reports varied in the type of 
common food stuff stored (rice or corn) and in the use of either an emphatic perceptual evidential or 
an utterance with an egophoric evidential and a reported speech particle. Only one person did not 
choose the emphatic perceptual evidential. Therefore, in these situations where someone is describing 
a specific event, the perceptual evidential is considered by speakers to mark more direct knowledge 
than the egophoric copula with the reported speech particle, indicating second-hand information. 
This may seem to be a straightforward order of preference for certain types of evidence, except 
it does not hold across all scenarios, even for the same speaker. VL had said that the emphatic 
perceptual was preferred over the egophoric when describing the dress in the first scenario described 
above, and that the perceptual evidential was preferred to the reported speech particle in the second. 
This was in concord with the responses of the other participants. In another situation two people 
describing the colour of a new goat purchased by someone in the village, one person used the 
perceptual evidential dù, while the other used the egophoric yè. In this scenario VL appeared to have 
different intuitions, in that she did not want to presume that one report was more likely to be correct 
that then other, instead stating that both participants saw the colour of the goat (39). 
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(39) ɲí thóŋ-sin 
 two see-PST 
 ‘two saw’ (VL 101224-02) 
 
This is of interest because the other two times she chose a perceptual evidential over the 
egophoric or reported speech particle, stating that the person who used the perceptual evidential 
presumably saw the item or event, while the person using ego-marking or reported speech had not. It 
is possible that because scenario one was early in the task VL was still getting used to the format, but 
it is also possible that the ‘egophoric means no visual perception’ idea is not as strong as Lamjung 
Yolmo speakers’ introspection about some contexts indicates. 
Although speakers appear to share some consensus in the situation above, in eight of the ten 
scenarios there was a great deal less agreement. There were some scenarios where the choice of modal 
or evidential expression did not appear to make any difference to which of the two options people 
chose. This included situation ten, where participants were given reports that their shoes were either 
outside or in another room, with one marked with a perceptual evidential and one marked with a 
reported speech marker. Across all of the performances of this experiment participants chose either 
option and did not appear to be swayed by which one was marked with which form. UL, VL and KL 
all preferred the report that the shoes were outside with the perceptual evidential. AL and RL 
preferred the outside option marked with the reported speech marker. In this situation the cultural 
politeness (not usually enacted in village life) of not wearing shoes inside may have influenced 
decisions more than the evidential forms. Given that this task was only performed with a small 
number of speakers across a fixed set of scenarios, it is best to not draw any strong conclusions about 
the lack of agreement in terms of the modal information given in the multiple reports; however it does 
indicate that perhaps speakers may not pay as much attention to modal information in Lamjung 
Yolmo as de Villiers et al. (2009) argues that they do in Standard Tibetan. 
3  Evidentiality looking forward 
In this paper I have demonstrated that the nature of evidentiality in Lamjung Yolmo is complex, 
interacts with other elements of the utterance and its context, and is grounded in interaction. It is 
likely that with the growing body of language documentation work that focuses on interactional data 
such descriptions will become more common.  
Evidentiality is part of speakers’ larger stance-taking repertoire, and as such interacts with 
many other features of the language, including epistemic modality. There is no reason to follow 
Bhat’s (1999) lead and completely conflate evidentiality with epistemic modality. It is not necessary 
to assume a direct relationship between the type of evidential used and the certainty that the speaker 
has about the information. Although it is possible to ascribe a sense of certainty to the contextual use 
of evidentials in Lamjung Yolmo, this is an interactional dimension of these forms, and not an 
intrinsic value. Therefore, it does not make sense to talk about evidentials as a type of epistemic 
modality. De Haan (1997, 1999, 2001a, 2005) argues that evidentiality is not a form of modality, in 
part because it is fundamentally deictic in its function. Considering the deictic function of evidential 
forms is a useful way of conceptualising their function, but it does not detract from the fact that 
speakers use this deictic function in interaction, and part of that function is to signal their stance 
towards the propositional content. 
With this wider perspective on evidentiality, it is not surprising that it interacts in complex ways with many 
other features of language, but it is important that we capture the range of these interactions. Although I have 
covered many key features of evidential use in interaction in this paper, there are still many others that could be 
considered, including question structures and reported speech frames, both of which I discuss in detail in Gawne 
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(2013a). Strong interactive data that also includes the wider function of evidentiality also gives us stronger 
grounds for quality cross-linguistic comparison, and a basis from which to begin understanding further 
questions, such as how children acquire languages with evidentiality. 
Abbreviations 
1 first person 2 second person 3 third person AUX auxiliary COP copula DUB dubitative EGO egophoric 
EMPH emphatic ERG ergative F female FOC focus GEN genitive GF general fact IPFV imperfective LOC 
locative NEG negative NMLZ nominaliser NON.PST non-past PART particle PE perceptual evidential PFV 
perfective PST past SG singular  
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